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Communication
Robert H. Wortham, Joanna J. Bryson
1 Introduction: Scope of Chapter
From a traditional engineering perspective, communication is about effecting
control over a distance, and its primary concern is the reliability of transmis-
sion. As with much in biomimetics, we find that such traditional problems
and practices are not entirely separable from the situation in nature, but that
a natural perspective better informs the true requirements of even engineered
autonomous systems. In particular, nature allows for collaborative control with
minimal signals, generating robust, distributed systems. Human communication
also employs the exceptional capacity of language, but robot-human interaction
requires an understanding of implicit mechanisms of human communication as
well.
Here we review communication in nature, describing the evolution of com-
munication from the perspective of the selfish gene. We explore whether commu-
nication arose from collaboration or manipulation, and the reasons why com-
munication in nature is ubiquitous and generally honest, given the apparent
evolutionary benefits of free-riding. We consider the content necessary for com-
munication, and show that context and relevance allow a message to be ef-
fectively communicated with very little information transfer. Humans possess
the unique ability to communicate with language, and we explore how this dif-
fers from the non-verbal communication we share with other animals, and the
challenges that robots face when using language for communication.
We then review communication in contemporary biomimetic systems. From
the perspective of communication, these fall into several categories, depending
on whether the communication is between robots, or between robot and human,
and also whether the robotic system is fully autonomous (has its own goals), or
is in some sense collaborating with a human to achieve a goal. Swarm robotics,
inspired by social insects such as bees and ants, requires non-centralised, dis-
tributed communication mechanisms and we consider some of the work in this
area to date. Designing autonomous human-robot interaction predicates an un-
derstanding of human social interaction, and we review relevant background
psychology. We also review work to date in the generation of synthetic emo-
tion and the ability of robots to sense and classify human emotion. Finally, we
provide some pointers for future directions and further reading.
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2 Biological principles
2.1 Collaboration or manipulation?
When thinking of the fundamentals of natural communication — in fact, all
communication — we need to define what communication essentially entails.
First, there must be some kind of signal. Second, there must be a receiver that
has beliefs or behaviour which are modified by reception of the signal. The
degree to which receipt of a signal benefits either sender or receiver necessar-
ily depends on what the receiver would have chosen to do without the signal.
For intentional communication, the sender must knowingly want the signal to
achieve the definite purpose of modifying the beliefs or behaviour of another.
But the term communication is used widely in the natural sciences, including
to describe behaviour in plants and microbia that are not ordinarily considered
to have intentions. Even linguistic communication in humans can include unin-
tended, unconscious signalling, sometimes even counter to the known goals of
the sender. For example, a speaker’s tone may reveal an emotional state the
speaker wishes to keep hidden.
Intuitively, one might think of communication as facilitating cooperation,
both in animals and humans. We might imagine that the capacity to com-
municate arose from a desire by natural agents to interact with each other to
achieve shared objectives. Communication may indeed appear cooperative when
it facilitates the achievement of a shared goals, such as reproduction, food col-
lection in colonies and so on. Even antagonistic communication can be seen
as cooperative if it facilitates finding lower-cost resolution to conflicting goals,
as in competition over a particular mate or access to another scarce resource.
We might therefore suppose that historically, organisms that cooperated via
communication were better able to achieve their goals, and so prospered from
an evolutionary perspective. Unfortunately this kind of common sense think-
ing arises from what Oxford ethologist David McFarland called the “incurable
disease” of anthropomorphism (McFarland and Bo¨sser, 1993, pg. 1). That is,
we might apply human characteristics (or assumed human characteristics) to
non-human entities and thus infer human thought patterns where none exist.
In stark contrast, Dawkins (1976) forwards the perspective of Darwinian
evolution. All living organisms are driven by a set of ‘selfish genes’ that succeed
only through replicating themselves. However, genes do not fight the necessary
battles for survival and reliable replication on their own. Rather, they collab-
orate, fighting inside ‘survival machines’ or ‘Vehicles’ composed also of other
genes — the organisms we observe in nature. These organisms are themselves
driven to compete in order to advance the reproductive goals of their genes,
and any communication that evolves between organisms will only evolve if it
benefits the organism sending the signal (or at least the gene triggering it to do
so) relative to others. Thus Dawkins (1982) frames communication as arising
as coercion, not cooperation. Dawkins argues that all such inter-organism com-
munication, whether between individuals (e.g. sexes) of the same species, or
between differing species can be viewed as one organism manipulating another
with the ultimate goal of replicating its genes. Further, Scott-Phillips et al.
(2012a) show that a state of non-interaction is an evolutionarily stable strategy,
and so communication will not necessarily emerge even when it is in both parties
interest.
2
However, these observations do not mean that cooperative, mutually bene-
fitial or even altruistic communication cannot evolve. Because genes are shared
within and even across species, they can also motivate behaviour that is costly
to an individual Vehicle, so long as that behaviour is beneficial to securing copies
of those genes existing in the future (Hamilton, 1964; Gardner and West, 2014).
Nevertheless, it is worthwhile for a robotics developer to remember that biol-
ogists always think of communication in terms of its costs, risks and benefits
for all individuals involved, and that coercion may be a more useful metaphor,
particularly for systems that are self-learning, or involve components owned by
multiple parties, each with their own goals and constraints.
2.2 Origins and stability of communication
Communication incurs measurable cost arising both from the energy expended
and time used in order to generate signal, and from the risk that the signal may
transmit information to competitors rather than collaborators, for example a
predator drawn by bird song. Additionally, the presence of a signalling mecha-
nism may otherwise affect the performance of an animal, for example the weight
of the peacock’s tail. Biology now views this cost as part of the signal’s mech-
anism — the cost itself communicates the value(s) of the signaller, for example
the quality of the individual that can support such a handicap (Zahavi and Za-
havi, 1997). The essential argument of the handicap principle is that observable
handicaps serve as necessarily honest signals — signals that can be trusted by
the recipient — because of the increased cost to the signaller incurred by the
handicap. Honest signals are important for recipients given the evolutionary
pressure for coercion, for example a peahen prefers to find the best mate to
inseminate her eggs. Honesty may also be assured via two mechanisms: Indices
and Deterrents (Scott-Phillips, 2011). Indices are mechanisms where the signal
form is tied to signal meaning. For example, the frequency of an animal’s roar
being directly tied to its size. Deterrents are mechanisms that punish dishonest
signals with excessive cost, such as weight, visibility, or duration (e.g. Tibbetts
and Izzo, 2010).
Viewing communication through this evolutionary lens raises two questions:
Firstly, how does communication come to emerge at all, and secondly, why
is it an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), when there are selfish individual
benefits to both non-participation and dishonesty?
The first question raises the chicken and egg problem of communication: how
did communication first arise, since there is always a cost (opportunity, risk or
metabolic) to creating a signal, and may be some similar cost to having the
apparatus to receive the signal (Smith and Harper, 1995). Who would bear this
cost first? There is no benefit to creating a signal if there is no capable receiver.
Similarly why would there be an adaptation to receive signals, when then are no
signals to receive? This question is neatly addressed by Hauser (1996) and Scott-
Phillips et al. (2012a), who show how communication evolves from precursor
interactions that do not fully meet our definition of communication. These
interactions can be categorised as either ritualization, or sensory manipulation.
For example, an animal may use urine or faeces to mark territory. How does
this arise? Initially the animal may experience fear when at the boundary
of its territory, and so may relieve itself there, without communicative intent.
The presence of this material may act as a cue for others and thus become
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associated with territorial boundaries. Through ritualisation of this behaviour
a communication channel is established. Hauser makes the useful distinction
between cues and signs as precursors to communicative intent: cues vary over
time, whereas signs are temporally invariant.
Sensory manipulation involves one individual stimulating the senses of an-
other in order to affect the receiver’s behaviour to the benefit of the signaller,
but without intending to communicate that intention to the receiver. The ex-
ample often given here is of a male insect wishing to mate with a female. He
brings the female food, coercing her to stay and eat the food, allowing mating.
Since this behaviour is beneficial to the species (or more precisely, beneficial to
the replication of genes shared by two individuals capable of breeding), females
also evolve to recognise the bringing of food as a precursor to mating, and hence
communication arises. Only if recognising the signal is generally of benefit to
the receiver will the receiver evolve to do so. However, sometimes evolution may
exploit a normally-useful signal in a way that does not benefit the receiver, as in
the case of mimicry (Wickler, 1968; Johnstone, 2002). If recognising the signal
is not of more general benefit than cost, then receivers will evolve to ignore the
signal, and the signaller will incur its costs without benefit. This begins to show
us why animal communication is generally ‘honest’ rather than ‘deceptive’; for
further discussion see Hauser (1996). Scott-Phillips et al. (2012a) postulate that
ritualization is the more common route to communication, since the prerequi-
sites are less restrictive, and also the initial cues are implicitly honest.
2.3 Content necessary for communication
Much research in artificial multi-agent systems has focussed on the expressive
power of communicative languages (Wooldridge, 2009). In contrast, natural
communication systems tend to exploit relatively simple and minimal signals,
the meaning of which essentially derives from extensive models. In other words,
evolution, or a shared phylogenetic history, provides adequate priors such that
minimal data is required to communicate context. For example, mating calls
primarily discriminate which species is calling, and secondarily the quality and
possibly other attributes of the caller. Calls between offspring and mothers sig-
nal identity and emotional state, and must be hard for a predator to imitate
coercively (de Oliveira Calleia et al., 2009, in robotics, identity and associ-
ated forgery concerns are ordinarily handled with encryption.) The pronking
of gazelles not only signals to herd-mates the presence of a predator, but also
to the predator that that the individual at least is fit enough to have detected
them and as such is probably a bad target for an attempted kill (Caro, 1994).
Tinbergen (1952) offers four useful perspectives through which natural com-
munication can be understood:
• Mechanistic: the physical communication mechanisms — neural, physio-
logical, psychological.
• Ontogenetic: the genetic and environmental factors that guide develop-
ment of communication.
• Functional: the effect of communication on survival and reproduction.
• Phylogenetic: the historic origins of the species and its communicative
traits, which determine available mechanisms.
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Tinbergen’s fascinating research with gulls set the precedent for demonstrating
that only very basic signalling is required for effective communication to facili-
tate the entire lifecycle (Tinbergen and Falkus, 1970). The power of this sort of
communication is still present in human communicative systems, and may still
often implicitly determine our behaviour. Humans are communication machines,
having not only language, but an extrordinary array of pheremones for an ape
(Stoddart, 1990). Even in language, we are influenced by implicit information
such as affect and dialect. Newborn babies are more likely to attend to (and
therefore learn from) people sharing their mother’s dialect (Fitch, 2004). Of
course, human language also contains explicit content, discussed further below.
Shannon and Weaver (1971) provide us with a quantitative methodology
for the evaluation of the information content involved in any communication.
They start from the assumption that we can measure information transmission
by investigating the reduction in uncertainty that follows from the successful
transmission of a message. The general architecture employed in the analysis is
source→ message→ signal→ +noise→ receiver → destination (1)
The theory shows that information content is proportional to the logarithm of
the number of choices in the message.
H(X) = −
∑
i
P (xi) logn P (xi) (2)
where X is a sequence of symbols forming the message, i is the number of
symbols in the message, and n is the number of choices for each symbol in the
message (for a message consisting of binary 1’s and 0’s then n = 2).
If there are few choices (i.e. the received signal is from a small set of possible
choices) then this implies little actual information transfer. If we then add to
this context of interpretation of the signal by the receiver, i.e. given the internal
state of the receiver, what valid subset of messages is it expecting to receive,
we see that often the actual information required to transfer a message is very
low. The addition of noise during signal transmission reduces the rate at which
a communication channel of given capacity can accurately transmit the desired
message.
C = W log2
P + N
N
(3)
Where C is the capacity of the channel given the noise, W is the bandwidth
of the channel, P is the power of the signal, and N is the power of the noise.
We can see that the higher the noise level, the lower the rate of information
transmission, determined by the relative power of the noise, compared with the
power of the signal. Shannon’s theory can be very usefully applied to natural,
human and artificial communication (see further Allen and Hauser, 1993).
2.4 Language as an exception
Humans have long assumed that other animals have languages we just haven’t
learned, yet despite extensive research there is in fact no evidence that any other
extant species shares a communication system with anything like the power for
expression and innovation displayed in all human languages. Given its core im-
portance not only for communication but for cognition, explanations for this
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unique trait are a holy grail for much of biological anthropology and cognitive
science. Possible answers range from the theological to the technical, the latter
including an also-mysteriously-unique capacity for representations supporting
indefinite recursion (Hauser et al., 2002) or at least being able to reason about
minds (Stiller and Dunbar, 2007; Moll and Tomasello, 2007). A simpler expla-
nation is that hominids share with other apes adaptations such as long lives
and big brains that facilitate exploiting culture — the communicating of novel
behaviour between local conspecifics — but are unique among simians in the
otherwise rather common adaptation for vocal imitation (Bryson, 2009). How-
ever, since there is no consensus on explaining human language in particular
or uniqueness more generally, we leave this question to the section on further
reading.
One radical theory related to language origins that is becoming increasingly
accepted (though not in its details) is the idea of memetics, again first postulated
by Dawkins (1976). This is the theory that humans have a dual replicator
system, that is, that we are subject to two orthogonal strands of evolution
(Richerson and Boyd, 2005). The first is genetic evolution, common to the rest
of biology, but the second is the evolution of concepts and ideas — memetic
material. Although no one has identified exactly what a meme might be, the
same is true of genes. Although DNA, the genetic material and substrate by
which biological information is transmitted has now been identified (long after it
was first hypothesised), the discrete units thought to be genes are still not well
understood (Dennett, 1995). Language is currently the main substrate by which
human ideas are transmitted and innovated, but it is by no means the only one:
we also learn from gestures, models and other artefacts. In addition, language
itself is generally presumed to be a result of memetic cultural evolution.
What is critical to understand for a roboticist is that language evolves contin-
uously. Contrary to much schooling, there is no ‘correct’ way to speak English
or any other language, only ways that signal particular educational or social
backgrounds, or ways that are more or less effective for communicating in a
particular community. Also, the words in languages represent a set of con-
cepts found historically to be of value for communication and thinking. Just
because a concept has its own word in one language does not guarantee that
there is a single-word translations for that concept in any other language, or
indeed that that concept will make sense in another culture. As our concepts
and communities constantly change, so do our languages. Nevertheless, people
have historically managed to transact complex commercial and individual ne-
gotiations with people with whom they do not share a language. This is again
partly because we can assume a set of likely desires and capacities for any other
human, so can guess the meaning of some essential phrases and gestures with
only a limited amount of context. We also tend to create simplified languages,
called pigeons, when two language groups come together. These concepts may
be useful for communicating with robots.
When human language is involved, there is little apparent cost to employing
deception to gain advantage that would be evolutionarily advantageous. The
problem of creating an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) for human language
is therefore more complex. Scott-Phillips (2011) has proposed a mechanism by
which human communication could become evolutionarily stable, and this relies
heavily on the idea of reputation as a social governor of honesty. Uniquely in
nature, human communication also involves epistemic vigilance; the ability to
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evaluate reliably received communications as to whether they are true or false
before acting on them. Human language is also famously symbolic, with one
term able to reference multiple real world objects, but as implied by our earlier
discussion of information theory, this capacity for generalisation may be a fairly
common attribute of communicative systems.
3 Existing Biomimetic Systems
Typically in robotics we broaden the idea of communication to include all types
of social interaction between actors. Robot social interaction can thus be divided
into two broad categories: robot-robot interaction, and human-robot interaction
(HRI). For biomimetic robots, the major current field of study for multiple au-
tonomous interacting robots is termed Swarm robotics. HRI can be further
subdivided into human-directed collaboration with robots, versus interaction
with autonomous robots. In the former, the robot and human work collabo-
ratively to achieve a given task. The robot, whilst intelligent, does not have
sufficient cognitive capacity, or more simply the motivational agency, to choose
high-level goals or perform tasks alone. Human collaborators may be required
to assist with planning, expert knowledge, dexterous manipulation or other as-
pects of the task. More autonomous HRI provides the greatest challenge, and
here various techniques have been adopted to enable the robot to communicate
effectively with humans.
3.1 Swarm robotics
Parker (2008) describes three commonly used paradigms for building distributed
intelligent systems:
• Bio-inspired, emergent swarms paradigm,
• Organizational and social paradigms, and
• Knowledge-based, ontological, and semantic paradigms.
Swarm robotics takes its inspiration from social insects, and involves the
distributed, self coordination of significant numbers of relatively simple robots.
Robot swarms may be homogeneous, where all robots have the same phys-
ical morphology and AI capabilities, or heterogeneous, where robots within
the swarm may be specialised for different tasks, or have differing capabilities.
Rather than some centralised or remote controlling system, swarm robotics pred-
icates local sensing and communication abilities (S¸ahin, 2005). The advantages
of such a decentralised approach are that it provides both scalability (number
of robots) and robustness (resilience to failure Winfield, 2000; Rubenstein et al.,
2014).
One of the notable characteristics of swarm robotics research is the (rela-
tively) complex behaviours that can be coordinated with very simple signalling.
Parker (1998) developed the alliance heterogeneous swarm control architec-
ture, where all communication was broadcast, rather than directed to individu-
als within the swarm. Each robot broadcast its location and current behaviour,
avoiding the need for others to gather this information via sensors. The robot’s
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location and activity were broadcast at a known frequency (rate). If others did
not receive this information after a pre-determined timeout, then they assumed
the robot was no longer active.
Howard et al. (2006) demonstrates a large heterogeneous mobile robot team,
with the shared task of mapping an unknown territory. Each robot is identified
with a unique fiducial marker rather like a ‘bar code’, simply and effectively
communicating its identity. rfid tags may also be used for this task. Each
robot measures the identity, range and heading of adjacent robots. The esti-
mated position and pose data of each robot is combined using udp (broadcast)
messaging over a wireless network to create a shared global map. Interesting
communication features here include:
• The use of ‘mapper/leader’ robots that have better sensors, leading ‘sen-
sor’ robots with much cheaper and less functional sensor capabilities.
• The use of broadcast messaging to achieve scalable information transfer,
and the ability of the overall system to tolerate lossy communications.
Fredslund and Mataric (2002) examine the problem of achieving and main-
taining robot formations. In keeping with the norms of artificial swarm research
more generally (Reynolds, 1987), robot formations were found that could be
maintained by a simple shared algorithm that focusses solely on a neighbour in
the formation. Minimal communication is needed to establish the desired for-
mation and the role of each robot within the formation e.g. who is the leader.
Werfel et al. (2014) have extended such work, presenting an algorithm that,
taking a three-dimensional shape as input, produces distributed instructions
such that a robot swarm can construct that shape. Rubenstein et al. (2014)
demonstrates a similar algorithm that works in two dimensions for a swarm of
1000 robots. The lesson here is that once again, very minimal broadcast com-
munication is needed, in addition to sensor input, to achieve sophisticated and
coordinated behaviour, although how to generate the individual heuristics or
‘plans’ for the robots is an ongoing and promising area of research.
Swarm robotics can be sufficiently biomimetic that they may be used for
scientific studies in the the evolution of communication. Floreano et al. (2007)
investigated whether altruistic communication could evolve in robot swarms.
Robots were able to emit and perceive a blue light, and also a red light that was
colocated with a food source (charging station). Each robot was equipped with
an omnidirectional, colour sensitive camera. In this experiment the learning was
not individual (ontogenetic), but evolutionary (phylogenetic) using genetic algo-
rithms over a neural controller. A physics-based robot simulation environment
was used for many of the generations, but at regular intervals generations oc-
curred on real robots. As predicted by the theory of inclusive fitness describesd
above, Floreano et al. (2007) found that communication readily evolves when
colonies consist of genetically similar individuals and when selection acts at the
colony level. Further, Mitri et al. (2011) found that when associated with unre-
lated individuals, the robots evolved ‘deceptive’ signals, leading to world-wide
headlines that scientists had evolved lying robots.
More often though, science demands the simplest model necessary for par-
simony, validation, and analytic tractability. There is a recent trend in using
biomimetic ‘robots’ to provide controlled input for examining animal social cog-
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nition. However, in many cases the robots are only biomimetic in shape or other
appearance, with no appreciable cognitive skills (Faria et al., 2010).
3.2 Human Robot Collaboration
Robots may be thought of as tools, facilitating the achievement of goals for hu-
mans (Bryson, 2010). Some tasks are currently too complex, or involve too much
risk, to allow a fully autonomous robot to attempt them unaided. Human-Robot
Collaboration (HRC) provides a methodology enabling humans and robots to
work as partners to accomplish these tasks. Fong et al. (2002) explore human-
robot dialogue to facilitate mutual assistance for the achievement of common
goals. Interestingly, in this study the human functions as a resource for the
robot, providing information and processing like other system modules. Using
a very structured textual communication system, the robot can ask questions
of the human as it works. This approach provides the robot with more freedom
in execution and is more likely to find good solutions to its problems. Effective
collaboration requires information sharing between parties, so collaborative con-
trol considers both user (human) and robot needs (Sheridan, 1997). The need
to make robots comprehensible to human partners is in fact sometimes used as
a justification for bioinspired approaches to robotics (Brooks and Stein, 1994;
Sengers, 1998; Novikova and Watts, 2014b).
One effective means to share information with human collaborators is via
Augmented Reality (AR), the overlaying of computer-generated graphics onto
the real worldview. Green et al. (2008) introduce AR techniques by first dis-
cussing the communication necessary for human-human collaborative activity.
In order to achieve useful work together, a common ground of shared under-
standing about the world must be achieved. Within a human-robot collabora-
tion scenario, this grounding of symbols and their meanings is similarly vitally
important (Steels, 2008). Green et al. (2008) review work carried out at nasa
and elsewhere to implement AR. Within an AR environment, in addition to
speech, humans can communicate using a wide variety of non-verbal cues such
as gaze, nodding and other deictic gestures, with AR providing the grounding
context.
More recent work takes a probabilistic approach to collaborative decision
making (Kaupp et al., 2010). Human ‘operators’ can be regarded as remotely lo-
cated, valuable information sources which need to be managed carefully. Robots
then decide when to query operators using Value-Of-Information theory, i.e. hu-
mans are only queried if the expected benefit of their observation exceeds the
cost of obtaining it. In this study a navigation task is executed jointly by robot
and human. The robot navigates a maze with local sensory input (a laser scan-
ner), but transmits its visual camera signal to the remote human operator for
interpretation. When the robot needs high level visual information in order to
make a decision, it simply queries the human, rather than having to interpret
the raw visual information from the camera. This sort of ‘human in the loop’
approach is also often proposed for actions that may have ethical consequences,
such as assaults by military robots (Vallor, 2014; Hellstro¨m, 2013).
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3.3 Autonomous Human Robot Interaction
In order to use a biomimetic approach for autonomous HRI, we first need to
consider human-human social interaction. When we communicate, we claim the
attention of one or more others. This implies that the information communi-
cated is relevant to the receiver. Therefore relevance may be seen as the key
to human communication and cognition (Sperber and Wilson, 1986). In order
to communicate in a relevant manner, we may need to understand the mental
state of others. Understanding this mental state is known as Theory of Mind
(ToM). There is strong empirical evidence for ToM in adult humans, including
fMRI studies of contexts where ToM is exploited (Saxe et al., 2006). However,
Gallagher (2006) proposes a more direct understanding of the mental state and
intent of others from directly observable phenomena. For example, one can
read emotion and infer intention directly from the faces of others, without hav-
ing to conduct any ‘mind reading’. This background psychology is important for
understanding and designing effective human-robot communications, not least
because all human-robot interactions inevitably involve some anthropomorphi-
sation on the part of the human.
Kanda et al. (2002) describe studies using a humanoid robot able to gen-
erate many human-like communication behaviours, and equipped with sensors
enabling human non-verbal and verbal communication to be sensed. This work
develops the idea of communicative relationships between human and robot,
based on relevance theory. For example, humans more easily understand a
robot’s verbal utterances once they have built a prior relationship with the
robot. This idea of communication requiring perceived relevance in order to be
successful is reinforced by Kuchenbrandt et al. (2014), who found that the effi-
cacy of human-robot interaction is significantly affected by the perceived gender
of the robot, the gender of the human, and the stereotypic gender association
of the task.
One of the major breakthroughs in autonomous robotics has been the de-
sign and development of robotic imitation learning. This enables robots to be
taught new tasks by human demonstration (supervised learning), and then to
perfect these tasks through practice (unsupervised learning). This essentially
biomimetic — and memetic — approach of social learning through communica-
tion (Meltzoff and Moore, 1995; Schaal, 1999) continues to deliver increasingly
outstanding results, and is a major success in human-robot (primarily) non-
verbal communication. The work of Billard and Hayes (1997), Klingspor et al.
(1997), and Breazeal and Scassellati (2002) foresaw that this approach would
produce machines that are useful, flexible and easy to use. Movement prim-
itives can be learned from demonstration and then combined generatively by
the robot to produce novel behaviours for new tasks as they arise. Grasping
and manipulation are good examples of such behaviours. Recently this work
has developed using advanced probabilistic techniques to allow previously un-
seen objects to be effectively grasped and manipulated by interpolating known
behaviours (Huang et al., 2013; Kopicki et al., 2014).
Non-verbal communication by robots can be used to great effect to signifi-
cantly improve the productivity of human-robot teams, both in terms of speed
of communication, and robustness to errors in communication (Breazeal et al.,
2005). Humans maintain a mental model of the robot and non-verbal communi-
cation has been found to help with inference of the internal ‘mental’ state of the
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robot. The design principles for non-verbal communication can again be taken
from psychology, e.g. feedback, affordances, causality and natural mappings
(Sengers, 1998; Breazeal et al., 2005). Humans typically display emotions non-
verbally as part of normal communication, and whilst this may be synthesised
readily in humanoid robots (Zecca et al., 2009), body expressions alone have
also been successfully used to indicate emotional responses in non-humanoid
robots (Novikova and Watts, 2014a). It should not be forgotten that only a
small percentage of human communication involves words. Non-verbal, and
particularly synthetic emotional communication can significantly enhance the
persuasive power of an autonomous robot (Andre´ et al., 2011).
3.4 Future directions
There is clear market pressure for further biomemetic communication in domes-
tic robotics. Users find natural communication intuitive and often attractive.
This approach is not without hazards or at least critics, however. The imita-
tion of life may cause humans to overrespond to robots or misattribute value
or fragility, leading consumers to waste time or money on attending to robots
(Ashrafian et al., 2014). However, such concerns only apply to transmission by
the robot, and may be ameliorated by sufficiently transparent signals (Bryson
and Kime, 2011; Boden et al., 2011). As mentioned in our review of nature,
reception and comprehension of signals will generally take precedence in any
communication system involving learning or evolving actors, as recognising and
categorising stimuli and associating these with appropriate beliefs or actions are
fundamental to cognitive capacity.
Substantial advances are currently being made not only in vision and speech
recognition, but also in sensing human emotion. By fusing Bayesian classifi-
cation of speech audio, facial expression, and gesture, higher recognition rates
have been achieved than by analysing speech alone. Kessous et al. (2009) al-
ready report high recognition rates for anger, irritation, joy, pride, and sadness.
Even deception can be detected (Schuller et al., 2008). However, there is still
much work to do in this area. Schuller (2012) lists “confidence, deception, frus-
tration, interest, intimacy, pain, politeness, pride, sarcasm, shame, stress, and
uncertainty,” as reasonable targets for comprehension, and the same may be
needed for production.
Returning to consider nature, we are only just beginning to understand
the importance of altruistic communication—the sharing of knowledge—and
information networks as an adaptive strategy for animals. At the same time,
we are eliminating most of the non-human biomass on our planet (Barnosky,
2008) creating gaps in critical ecosystem webs, including information networks.
Williams (2013) suggest that biomemetic robots might serve not only to replace
animals, but to guide or instruct those animals that remain. However, the
tractability and economic feasibility of large-scale application of technologies
of this type have yet to be demonstrated. In contrast, the use of robotics in
experimental biology and psychology is a promising trend likely to accelerate
(Krause et al., 2011). Such applications produce immediate value in scientific
research, and may also serve as testbeds for more ambitious ecological projects.
Finally, the widespread use of robotics promises a growing need for the im-
proved capacity for distributed autonomous robot control and communication.
From robot mining (Bonchis et al., 2014, hopefully a means to return to the less
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ecologically-damaging but more individually hazardous strategy of pit mining)
to urban disaster intervention (Sahingoz, 2013; dos Santos and Bazzan, 2011)
to bridge and sewer maintenance, the deployment of self-organising, self-healing
robot-only or human-and-robot systems holds promise for a better future with
more robust and responsive infrastructure (Abelson et al., 2000). Realising that
future in a way that benefits everyone involved requires — among many other
advances — excellent communication.
4 Learning more
For further reading we suggest the following. For those wishing to get to grips
with Darwinian evolution and evolutionarily stable strategies, Dawkins (1982)
is still the obvious starting point. The emergence of communication is neatly
covered by Scott-Phillips et al. (2012b). Those with a further interest in animal
communication should read Bradbury and Vehrencamp (2011) or Hauser (1996).
For further details on ecological and evolutionary constraints that affect the de-
sign of signals, see Davies et al. (2012). Hauser and Konishi (1999) supplements
this with additional detail on the design of animal communication. McFarland
(1986) is an excellent book covering animal behaviour from the perspective of
psychobiology, ethology and evolution. Finally, Scott-Phillips (2014) provides a
recent book-length introduction to human language from a comparative biolog-
ical perspective.
McFarland and Bo¨sser (1993) is an early but seminal book, concerned with
the application of animal behaviour (including communication) to robots. Parker
(2008) provides a useful overview of the field of distributed intelligence and its
application in multi-robot systems. Breazeal et al. (2005) provides a useful in-
troduction to nonverbal Human-Robot interaction. Pobil et al. (2014) is an
example of the wide range of communication related topics included within the
study of autonomous agents, and these proceedings contain serveral papers cov-
ering topics such as perceptual prediction and collective and social behaviour
achieved using swarm robotics techniques. Nourbakhsh (2013) predicts how we
might interact with robots in the near and far future.
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